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Abstract
This study examines how money and monetary policy have in-
uenced output and ination during the past decade in Israel by
comparing two New Keynesian DSGE models. One is a baseline
separable model (Galí, 2008) and the other assumes non-separable
household preferences between consumption and money (Benchimol
and Fourçans, 2012). We test both models by using rolling window
Bayesian estimations over the last decade (2001-2013). The results
of the presented dynamic analysis show that the sensitivity of output
with respect to money shocks increased during the Dot-com, Intifada,
and Subprime crises. The role of monetary policy increased during
these crises, especially with regard to ination, even though the ef-
fectiveness of conventional monetary policy decreased during the Sub-
prime crisis. In addition, the non-separable model including money
provides lower forecast errors than the baseline separable model with-
out money, while the inuence of money on output uctuations can
be seen as a good predictive indicator of bank and debt risks. By
impacting and monitoring householdsmoney holdings, policy makers
could improve their forecasts and crisis management through models
considering monetary aggregates.
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1 Introduction
The consequences and pace of the recent economic downturn, which began
with the Subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and was followed
by the global nancial crisis (GFC), di¤ered worldwide depending on the
countries involved and their monetary policies. Nevertheless, most coun-
tries shared at least one common element: an increase in the (relative) risk
aversion levels of households (Bernanke, 2009).
Risk aversion, which can be a perception, feeling, or behavior, leads
to changes in both household consumption and the money held by house-
holds. The trade-o¤ between consuming and holding money can be modeled
using non-separable preferences between consumption and money holdings
and testing the existence of non-separability parameters. At equilibrium,
consumption equals output in simple models, and even though this non-
separability parameter exists, it does not assign a signicant role to money
holdings with regard to output dynamics (Ireland, 2004; Andrés et al., 2006).
Despite their potential inuence on output, monetary aggregates and
money demand have largely been ignored in the dynamic models literature
(Woodford, 2003). Indeed, Christiano et al. (2010) show that dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models can identify and explain busi-
ness cycle dynamics as well as demonstrate how economic shocks a¤ect the
economy.1 However, by developing the now standard New Keynesian DSGE
models for the Eurozone and United States, and by excluding money shocks
from their model(s), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) do not assign money
an explicit role with regard to economic dynamics.
Nevertheless, the impact of money shocks on output is theoretically sig-
nicant when risk aversion is su¢ ciently high relative to the non-separability
parameter, as may be the case during crisis periods, and empirical tests with
Eurozone or US data conrm this result (Benchimol and Fourçans, 2012;
Caraiani, 2015; Benchimol and Fourçans, 2016). Indeed, comparing the out-
of-sample forecasts of these non-separable models with those obtained from
the baseline model à la Galí (2008) shows that assuming non-separability
between consumption and real money holdings improves the forecasting per-
formance of output during crises (Benchimol, 2011; Benchimol and Fourçans,
2016).
Unlike all the DSGE literature including money (Ireland, 2004; Andrés
et al., 2006; Barthélemy et al., 2011), Benchimol and Fourçans (2012) intro-
duce a microfounded money equation in the exible-price economy, enriching
1For those reasons, policymaking institutions and central banks are increasingly uti-
lizing DSGE models to assist in forecasting and policy decisions (Edge and Gürkaynak,
2010).
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economic dynamics, in line with Galí (2008), and estimate the models para-
meters through Bayesian estimations with several monetary policy rules and
risk aversion calibrations. Benchimol (2015) also introduces the concept of
exible-price real money.
Non-separability between consumption and money introduces money-
related variables into the ination and output equations. Thus, by mini-
mizing its loss function with respect to these two equations, the central bank
has to deal with money-related variables. Yet, the objectives, independence,
and autonomy of the Bank of Israel (BoI) do not directly refer to money or
monetary aggregates as instruments devoted to conducting monetary policy.
The main objective of the BoI is to maintain price stability while being inde-
pendent of politics and administrations. Therefore, it is interesting to test a
model in which consumption and money are not time-separable in household
preferences and to analyze the role of money and monetary policy on Israels
output dynamics during the past decade, including many interesting stylized
facts (the Dot-com, Intifada, and Subprime crises).
Most DSGE models of the Israeli economy ignore this non-separability
assumption and rather consider only small open economy models without
money (Binyamini, 2007; Argov and Elkayam, 2010; Argov, 2012; Argov
et al., 2012). Against this background, the present study does not aim to
build or use complex models in a small open economy; rather, our goal is
to analyze the role of money and monetary policy by using common macro-
economic variables. The use of complex small open economy DSGE models
forces us to assume and use controversial hypotheses such as the uncovered
interest rate parity condition or the law of one price (Corsetti et al., 2008;
Tovar, 2008), which strongly a¤ects the results. Since our study focuses on
money and monetary policy, and open economy features are assumed to be
included in our macroeconomic variables, analyzing the role of money and
monetary policy in the Israeli economy by using two simple closed-economy
models and perspectives should provide insightful results about the past
decade, as long as these DSGE models are calibrated with respect to the
literature on dynamic models in Israel (Argov, 2012; Argov et al., 2012).
To achieve this goal, we compare two New Keynesian DSGE models by
using Israeli data: one standard model that has separable household prefer-
ences (Galí, 2008) and another that assumes non-separability between con-
sumption and real money holdings in household preferences (Benchimol and
Fourçans, 2012). In contrast to previous authors, however, we use the Di-
visia monetary aggregates (Barnett, 1980) provided by the BoI. These are
both theoretically and empirically superior to the standard simple-sum mon-
etary aggregates used by Benchimol and Fourçans (2012, 2016), among others
(Fourçans, 2007; El-Shagi and Giesen, 2013), which simply add up the nom-
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inal value of all the monetary assets in circulation while ignoring that these
di¤erent assets yield di¤erent ows of liquidity services. At equilibrium, these
assets also di¤er in terms of the opportunity costs (or user costs) that house-
holds and rms incur when demanding those liquidity services. Because the
necessary condition for simple-sum aggregation is that all component assets
be perfect substitutes (Belongia and Ireland, 2014), simple-sum aggregates
are not used in our study.
Because risks in the medium or even the short run can be attenuated by
the reciprocation between good and bad news, while a mix of such news also
a¤ects the results, the empirical section of this paper provides rolling window
short sample Bayesian estimations in order to capture risks during short
periods. The Bayesian techniques used for the estimation and evaluation
of DSGE models are described in An and Schorfheide (2007), and following
Canova and Sala (2009), our small sample Bayesian estimation results are
robust.
The major results presented herein show that money shocks played an im-
portant role both during and after the Dot-com and Subprime crises. How-
ever, during the latter crisis, the e¤ect of monetary policy on output and
ination increased, whereas this was not the case during and after the for-
mer. Moreover, even though the non-separable model is simple, the e¤ect of
money shocks does not reect that of other (omitted) shocks.2
Further, the preference for holding money found in the present study
implies a positive incentive to save that could reduce the incentive to con-
sume. Hence, even though money does not serve any yield, holding a certain
amount is often preferred to holding a lower amount of money and/or con-
suming. Accordingly, all these transmission channels are strongly dependent
on risk perceptions. Therefore, preferences for money holding and output are
more linked during crises relative to non-crisis periods. Indeed, in line with
the ndings presented by Castelnuovo (2012), the variance decomposition of
output following a money shock can be seen as a good indicator of crises that
are not only nancial in nature.
In addition, comparing our results with a synthetic nancial conditions in-
dex (FCI), which is an aggregation of several risk measures (e.g., debt, bank,
foreign exchange, equities, residuals), provides interesting results. Speci-
cally, we monitor the weekly nancial and credit conditions in Israel (i.e.,
the FCI) by using a two-factor dynamic model,3 which provides the overall
2The non-separable model was also tested by adding an ad-hoc demand shock, and it
led to similar results.
3This model is fed by 28 variables, which are measures of the risk, leverage, and liquidity
in nancial markets, recorded non-simultaneously and at di¤erent frequencies (daily to
quarterly). The diagnostic ability of the FCI is superior to any of the single nancial
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measure of systemic nancial distress and idiosyncratic credit risk devia-
tion (Michelson and Suhoy, 2014). Using distance correlations and Granger
causality tests, we nd that the impact of a money shock on Israeli output
uctuations causes the FCIs debt and bank risks.
Moreover, this study focuses on impulse response functions, variance de-
compositions, and other indicators unrelated to quantities. We nd that
a money demand shock plays a role in varying output through household
preferences to hold rather than consume money during such periods. This
shock also reinforces the idea that unconventional monetary policy is impor-
tant during crises, when debt and bank risks are involved. Therefore, policy
makers should pay more attention to householdsmoney holdings, especially
during crisis periods, in order to improve standard monetary policy e¤ective-
ness while monitoring money demand shocks during periods of various kinds
of crises: nancial (Dot-com), political (Intifada), or debt or banking crises
(Subprime).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the methodology used for the estimations presented in Section 3. We analyze
and discuss the results in Section 4, Section 5 compares our results with the
FCI for Israel, Section 6 draws policy implications, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical methodology
Uncertainty and risk aversion are generally relatively low in the medium and
long-term, but they can be higher in the short run. Because the acquisition of
short-term information is encouraged by a high degree of uncertainty (Holden
and Subrahmanyam, 1996), all potentially informed investors in the economy
should aim to concentrate exclusively on the short-term instead of the long-
term.
To capture this phenomenon, we face a dilemma between theoretical and
statistical considerations. Theoretically, only very short study periods (from
one to a few years with quarterly data) are able to capture the changes in
parameter values induced by short-run crises. Yet, to be reliable, statisti-
cal analyses necessitate a su¢ cient amount of observations, even though a
specic statistical rule on the minimum number of observations necessary to
carry out reliable Bayesian tests is lacking.
To overcome this issue, we choose a sample size of 24 observations (quar-
terly data over 6 years) for our Bayesian estimations. Indeed, Fernández-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004) demonstrate that Bayes factors are
well understood for small sample Bayesian estimations, while Benchimol and
variables used.
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Fourçans (2016) produce robust results by using a sample size of 48 observa-
tions, with similar results also achieved with even smaller samples. Indeed,
several studies have shown that small sample Bayesian estimates tend to
outperform classical ones, even when evaluated by using frequentist criteria
(Geweke et al., 1997; Jacquier et al., 2002).
The period of interest, between 2001 Q2 and 2013 Q1, should contain
some higher uncertainty periods (e.g., Dot-com, Intifada, GFC). Hence, for
every quarter of the chosen period, we run Bayesian estimations by using the
24 observations4 before each respective quarter (rolling window estimation).
Thus, our sample starts in 1995 Q2 in order to match our period of interest.
The values of the micro- and macro-parameters that a¤ect the dynamics
of the variables over time are provided by these estimations. The role of each
shock is then analyzed by successive estimations and simulations, leading to
the impulse response functions and variance decompositions of the macro-
economic variables with respect to the examined shocks.5 We also compare
the respective root mean square deviations (RMSDs) of the two models to
assess their prediction performances.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Data
For both models, we use the same quarterly dataset of the Israeli economy
from 1995 Q2 until 2013 Q1. For each small sample estimation, we detrend
the data (all historical variables are at least I (0)) by using a moving window
linear detrending method: thus, the respective trend is only based on the
corresponding sample of observations, and detrended variables are stationary
over this sample.
Ination (^t) is measured as the detrended percentage change from one
quarter to the previous quarter of the GDP deator.6 Output (y^t) is measured
as the di¤erence between the log of real GDP per capita and its linear trend.
The interest rate (^{t) is the detrended central bank nominal interest rate. cmpt
4This short-sample can be replaced by a longer one including, for instance, 48 observa-
tions. This choice smooths our results as long as householdsrisk perceptions are diluted
through time.
5These shocks are the markup shock, "pt , the technology shock, "
a
t , the monetary policy
shock, "it, and, for Model 2, the money demand shock, "
m
t . These models are detailed in
the online appendix.
6This analysis was also conducted by using the core consumer price index (excluding
food and energy) and this produced identical results.
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is measured as the percentage change in real Divisia monetary aggregates per
capita and its linear trend.
The growth rate of Divisia monetary aggregates is a weighted average of
the growth rates of the quantities of its component assets. The weights are
expenditure shares based on the products of the user costs of the component
assets (prices) and the aforementioned quantities of these assets. Divisia
monetary aggregates are consistent with the economic theory of aggrega-
tion for ow data, in contrast to conventional sum aggregates.7 Our Divisia
monetary aggregates contain M1, self-renewing overnight deposit (NIS, unin-
dexed), and short-term deposit (NIS, unindexed). M1 is represented by the
publics current account, unindexed deposits, and currency and coin held by
the public. Here, we do not consider bills issued by the BoI (makam) divided
by maturity periods.
All these data are extracted from BoI databases. y^ft , exible-price output,
and cmpft , exible-price real money balances, are completely determined by
structural shocks. As we conduct a rolling window estimation, it is important
to note that the trend used for the detrended data is recalculated for each
estimation.8
3.2 Estimations
We calibrate both models (for calibration procedure and discussion, see the
online appendix) and estimate them by successive Bayesian estimations using
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Fig. 1). Fig. 1 presents the parameter
means from the Bayesian estimations for both models, showing that our
estimated micro-parameters are stable across the di¤erent periods. Following
Iskrev (2010), all estimated parameters are identied for both models.
The implied posterior distribution of the parameters for each sample size
and model is also estimated by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm:
three distinct chains, each of 50000 draws (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Adolf-
son et al., 2007). Most of the average acceptance rates per chain are in the
interval [0:29; 0:36], concurring with the ndings in the literature (Adjemian
et al., 2011). Please note, however, that our purpose here is not to present
all the results, as this would be a cumbersome task.9
7For detailed information about the construction of these data for Israel, see
http://www.boi.org.il/en/dataandstatistics/pages/dma.aspx.
8Then, each subsample is detrended di¤erently. That is why treated data and detrended
subsamples are not presented here and are available upon request.
9The parameter estimation results, validation, and robustness tests can be provided
upon request. All Student tests are above 1:96 for all short sample sizes (this analysis was
also conducted with other short sample sizes such as 28, 32, 36, and 40 observations), and
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The solid and dashed lines represent the results for the standard sepa-
rable model (Model 1) à la Galí (2008) and the model under non-separable
preferences (Model 2) à la Benchimol and Fourçans (2012), respectively.
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Figure 1: Micro-parameter values for both models during the past decade.
The Taylor rule parameter estimates for the past decade are displayed
parameter estimations are generally stable over time, irrespective of the short sample size,
at least for the rst moment (mean). Other short sample size estimations as well as the
distributions of the priors and posteriors are not presented but are available upon request.
We also tested Model 2 with di¤erent Taylor rules as in Benchimol and Fourçans (2012).
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in Fig. 1. This gure shows that between 2007 Q3 and 2010 Q4, a specic
monetary policy rule was implemented, namely a change in the smoothing
parameter (i) in some periods, while an increase in the ination gap coe¢ -
cient () and a decrease in the output gap coe¢ cient (x) can be seen at the
same time. Further, the estimated ination target (t) is stable around 2%
during the period, which is consistent with the objective of the BoI (3% - 1%),
but, importantly, this decreases between 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4, highlighting
a change in monetary policy targets.
Fig. 1 shows that the Calvo (1983) parameter () mean peaks during
the Subprime crisis, whereas the other micro-parameters such as the share of
working hours () in the production process, the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labor supply (), and the elasticity of substitution between individual goods
(") remain quite stable during the past decade.
Although the relative risk aversion parameter () does not change signi-
cantly, the non-separability parameter (), which could be seen as a measure
of the strength of the link between consumption and money in the non-
separable utility function (Model 2), increases from 2007 Q4 until 2008 Q4
(Fig. 1). During the Subprime crisis, households strengthened their link
between two choices, namely whether to hold money or consume it. This
parameter could also capture some of the dynamics of the crisis not captured
by the risk aversion parameter alone.
The fact that high risk aversion perceptions occur only during very short
periods masks the potential variations of its representative parameter ().
Thus, compared with the relative risk aversion parameter, the non-separability
parameter seems to be a better measure of behavioral changes or crisis per-
ceptions in Model 2.
Fig. 2 shows that most of the macro-parameters sharply change during
the Subprime crisis as well as during the Dot-com and Intifada crises, albeit
to a lower extent. After the Subprime crisis, the macro-parameters remain
stable until the end of the study period. This gure also shows that the
weights of money variables on output (mp and sm decrease) decrease after
2008 Q3, as the weight of the nominal interest rate on money declines during
that period.
The link between exible-price output and the money shock, measured
by ysm, also decreases during the crisis and remains stable until the end of
the period.
3.3 Simulations
In this section, we compute the impulse response functions and variance
decompositions of the estimated models, with respect to the corresponding
10
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Figure 2: Macro-parameter values during the past decade (Model 2).
date.
3.3.1 Impulse response functions
As we run rolling window estimations, it is interesting to compare the re-
sponses of several key variables to the studied shocks over time.10 Our pe-
riod of interest (2001 Q2 - 2013 Q1) includes the key dates of the Dot-com
crisis and GFC in Israel. Fig. 3 shows the responses of output and ina-
tion to these shocks, Fig. 4 illustrates the responses of the interest rate and
real money, and Fig. 5 presents the responses of exible-price output and
exible-price real money to the technology and real money shocks11. The
on-impact impulse responses for these two models are provided in the online
appendix.
10As the results are similar in terms of dynamics over the two models, we do not present
the impulse response functions of Model 1. All these results are available upon request.
11Because the price markup and interest rate shocks have no relevant impact on exible-
price output and exible-price real money, we do not present the corresponding impulse
response functions.
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Figs. 3 to 5 as well as the on-impact impulse responses show that a
structural change occurred between 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4 for the majority of
the economic variables. Similarly, another change, less structural in economic
terms, occurred between 2002 Q2 and 2004 Q3, the period that corresponded
to the Dot-com and Intifada crises.
As shown by Fig. 5, 2003 Q1 and 2008 Q3 are characterized by a lo-
cal level of risk maximum, and this could have inuenced the changes that
occurred. Between 2002 Q2 and 2004 Q3, the continuation of the Intifada
crisis and contraction of global demand, especially in the high-tech industry,
strongly a¤ected the Israeli economy (Bank of Israel, 2003). Moreover, be-
tween 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4, the impact of the beginning of the Subprime
mortgage defaults (2007 Q3) and collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008 Q4) in
the United States was strong in both developed and developing economies in-
cluding Israel, contracting global demand and reducing public wealth (Bank
of Israel, 2009).
Consequently, the impact of the price markup shock on ination and on
the nominal interest rate sharply reduced compared with the other selected
periods, reaching a local minimum around 2008 Q4. Then, from 2008 Q4
to 2013 Q1, the impact of the price markup shock on ination and on the
nominal interest rate increased, while the e¤ect of this shock on real output
and real money demand dropped to a local minimum around 2008 Q4. Note,
however, that the impact of the price markup shock on ination was higher
during the time when the Dot-com bubble burst around 2001 Q4. Indeed,
regardless of the study period, the presented results show that after a positive
price markup shock, the ination rate rises, thereby increasing the nominal
interest rate and decreasing the real interest rate, output, the output gap,
and real money balances.
The di¤erences between the impulse response functions are more due to
the impact responses than to the variations in the AR parameters, which
remain approximately stable throughout the study period (Fig. 1). For both
models, the AR parameter of the price markup shock p peaks around 2008
Q2. Note also that the AR parameter of the monetary policy shock i is
assumed to be nil, as in the Israeli DSGE literature (Argov, 2012; Argov
et al., 2012). In order not to give the money variable prior strength, we also
set the AR parameter of the real money shock m to zero.
Fig. 3 highlights that in response to a positive technology shock, output
increases but ination decreases, resulting in a rise in real money holdings
(Fig. 4) and a slight reduction in the real interest rate and the output
gap. The improvement in technology is partly accommodated by the central
bank, which lowers the nominal interest rate, while increasing the quantity
of money in circulation. However, the responses of our economic variables to
12
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Figure 3: Responses of ination and output over time to a one percent stan-
dard deviation shock (Model 2)
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Figure 4: Responses of the nominal interest rate and real money over time
to a one percent standard deviation shock (Model 2)
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Figure 5: Responses of exible-price output and exible-price real money
over time to a one percent standard deviation shock (Model 2)
a technology shock change over time: on-impact impulse response functions
(see the online appendix) highlight that the impact sensitivity of the macro-
economic variables to a positive technology shock undergoes two important
changes throughout the study period, one around 2002 Q4 and the other
around 2008 Q1. Interestingly, note that the sensitivity of output and its
exible-price counterpart to a technology shock peaked during the Dot-com
and Intifada crises, between 2002 Q1 and 2004 Q2, whereas their minimum
sensitivity was observed around the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 Q4.
This nding is partly explained by the overshooting of an economy a¤ected
by risk and uncertainty that had reached its highest level before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers.
Fig. 3 indicates that in response to an interest rate shock (i.e., a "conven-
tional" monetary policy shock), the ination rate, output, the output gap,
and real money balances fall (Fig. 4), whereas the nominal and real interest
rates rise. Note also that the interest rate shock on ination, output, and real
money demand changes sharply during the study period. For example, the
sensitivity of output and ination to a conventional monetary policy shock
reaches its lowest level around the Lehman Brothers collapse; however, this
was not the case during the Dot-com and Intifada crises. The level of the
sensitivity of output and ination to the (nominal) interest rate shock is thus
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an indicator of the e¤ectiveness of conventional monetary policy.
Figs. 3 to 5 also show that after a money demand shock, the nominal
and real interest rates, output, and the output gap rise. Moreover, ination
increases slightly then decreases over time to its steady-state value. Inter-
estingly, the responses of ination, output, and the interest rates during the
Dot-com and Intifada crises were more noticeable than those during the other
periods. Illustrating this point, in the period after the Subprime crisis and
Lehman Brothers collapse, the sensitivity of the examined macroeconomic
variables was at its lowest level.
3.3.2 Variance decompositions
In this subsection, we use these estimates in order to describe the evolution
of the variance decomposition of our variables over time with respect to these
di¤erent shocks in the short and long runs and to compare them for both
models.12
For Model 1, we decompose the forecast error variances for output, in-
ation, and the interest rate into the components attributable to each of
the following three shocks: "pt , "
a
t , and "
i
t. For Model 2, we decompose the
forecast error variances for output, ination, money, and the interest rate
into the components attributable to each of the following four shocks: "pt , "
a
t ,
"it, and "
m
t . The solid and dashed lines represent the historical variance de-
composition of Models 1 and 2, respectively, with respect to their respective
structural shocks.
Fig. 6 shows that the long-run impact of money demand on output is
not very signicant (less than 3%, except during the crisis peaks). In the
short run, it is also low except during the Dot-com, Intifada, and Subprime
crisis periods, where it peaks in 2004 Q1 (almost 8%) and in 2007 Q3 (8.3%).
These considerations concern only Model 2 (Model 1 does not include money
or a money shock).
Fig. 7 illustrates that the short- and long-run inuence of the monetary
policy shock on output increased from 2007 Q4 in Israel for both models.
This result conrms the important role of interest rate shocks for determin-
ing output variance. Note, however, that the impulse responses of output to
an interest rate shock (Figs. 3) are not related to the variance decompositions
of output with respect to this shock (Fig. 7). The rst measures the response
of a variable to a shock (sensitivity), whereas the second measures the con-
tribution level of a shock to the variance of the variable (role). Nevertheless,
12The variance decompositions of the variables under study, at the posterior means of
their respective estimations, with respect to the structural shocks, are reported in the
online appendix.
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irrespective of the considered model, we nd that a monetary policy shock
a¤ects output variance in line with the ndings presented in the literature
(Smets and Wouters, 2007).
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Figure 6: Variance decompositions of output with respect to the money shock
for Model 2 (%).
Variance decompositions available in the online appendix shows that dur-
ing the study period, the inuence of monetary policy on ination and output
increases for the two models. They also indicates that technology plays an
increasingly important role in the variance of output and ination until the
Subprime crisis and that the price markup shock role reaches its lowest level
in explaining ination and output variances during the Subprime crisis and
GFC periods. All these variance decompositions are in line with the ndings
in the DSGE literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Interestingly, most of these observations are not model-dependent, at least
in terms of dynamics. For instance, the impact of monetary policy on output
is slightly weakened by the role of money demand on output (Fig. 7). How-
ever, the dynamics are the same. Another example is the role of monetary
policy on ination, where Models 1 and 2 are almost undi¤erentiated.
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It is important to note that these estimations and simulations were also
carried out by using a preference shock instead of a markup shock, and with
an additional ad-hoc (demand) shock to the output equations (see the online
appendix), based on European and Israeli data. Whatever specication is
used, however, the additional demand shock does not capture whether the
behavior of the money demand shock and the role of money demand on our
variables during the crisis is always signicant and higher than that in other
less risky periods.
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Figure 7: Variance decompositions of output with respect to the monetary
policy shock for Models 1 and 2 (%).
Furthermore, Model 2 was also tested by using a money variable in the
monetary policy reaction function, i.e. m 6= 0 (see the online appendix).
Even though this specication reinforces the role of money in the economy,
the results are similar (see the online appendix for more details).
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3.3.3 Comparison of forecasting performance
Finally, we perform out-of-sample DSGE forecasts over four periods (i.e.,
one year) in order to compare the forecasting performance of both models,
after each estimation13 (Fig. 8). To do so, we simulate our estimated models
starting with a given state and analyze the trajectories of the forecasted
endogenous variables.
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Figure 8: Comparison of output and ination DSGE forecast errors. Model
2 is better when the bar is positive, Model 1 is better otherwise.
Specically, from each Bayesian estimation, we simulate the out-of-sample
forecasts of output and ination over the next four periods (one year) and
compare these values with the historical values to compute the RMSD of each
period for both models (Fig. 8). A negative number (negative bar) implies
that the non-separable models RMSD is higher than that of the baseline
model. In that case, the baseline model (Model 1) shows a better forecasting
performance than the model with money (Model 2). By contrast, a positive
number (positive bar) implies that the non-separable models RMSD is lower
1398 estimations, 49 for each model.
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than that of the baseline model. In such a case, the non-separable model
(Model 2) shows a better forecasting performance than the baseline model
(Model 1).
This analysis is performed by using Metropolis-Hastings iterations on the
basis of the posterior means of each estimated variable. Then, we compare
the forecasts with the actual data, before comparing the two modelsforecasts
by calculating their respective RMSDs. In particular, by summing the cor-
responding RMSD absolute values for the four out-of-sample forecasts (one
year), we compare these values for both models.
Fig. 8 shows that the model with money presents better predictive power
for output and ination dynamics than the baseline model, and that this is
the case for most of the study period, proving Model 2 has better predictive
power than Model 1 during the past decade in Israel.
4 Interpretation
As in Castelnuovo (2012), who assess moneys role in the postwar U.S. busi-
ness cycle by employing rolling window Bayesian estimations of a structural
model of the business cycle with money, we show that money demand has
an important impact on the Israeli business cycle during crises.
However, assuming non-separability between money and consumption in
the utility function can be seen as a shortcut to capturing the notion of a
transaction motive for holding money. In particular, the implied positive
relationship between consumption and the marginal utility of money can be
interpreted as follows: agents have to make more transactions in the goods
market to achieve a higher level of consumption, which makes larger real
holdings of the medium of exchange desirable. Accordingly, a structural
crisis modies this transmission mechanism by conferring an important role
for money holdings, especially on output dynamics.
A comparison of the impulse responses and variance decompositions dur-
ing the past decade in Israel allows us to explore this relationship between
money, monetary policy, and output (and, to a certain extent, ination) more
in depth in order to investigate the respective roles of several shocks on the
Israeli economy.
During the Dot-com and Intifada crises, as well as the Subprime crisis,
money played a more signicant role on output and exible-price output dy-
namics than during non-crisis periods, especially in the short-term. However,
while these values must thus be compared with the values presented by pre-
vious authors that show that moneys role on output is limited and negligible
(Ireland, 2004; Andrés et al., 2006, 2009), the impact of money on ination
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variability is very small (see all the variance decompositions in the online
appendix).
The peak of the role of money demand, which is equal to money supply
at equilibrium, on output uctuations corresponds to the beginning of the
Subprime crisis (2007 Q3) and to the foreign exchange purchases made by
the BoI (2008 Q1).
Throughout all crisis periods, the short-run impact of monetary policy on
output remains high (around 23% to 31%), but its value varies notably more
during the Subprime crisis, indicating its greater disruption compared with
the other studied periods. The di¤erent impacts of the monetary policy shock
on output uctuations in the two models seems to be caused by the presence
of the money demand shock, which inuences conventional monetary policys
role on output uctuations in the short run. In the long run, however, this
gap between the models decreases, becoming negligible at the end of the
study period (for other variance decompositions, see the online appendix).
The short-run impact of monetary policy shocks on ination variability
also remains high before and after each crisis period (10% to 18%), again with
larger changes during the Subprime crisis (see all the variance decompositions
in the online appendix). Moreover, the long-run impact of the monetary
policy shock on ination uctuations displays similar dynamics, highlighting
the leading role of the central bank in increasing its monetary policy impacts
on ination uctuations, especially during crises. This nding also concurs
with the main objective of the BoI in terms of maintaining the e¤ectiveness
of monetary policy, namely inuencing the ination rate.
Ultimately, whatever model is applied, the Subprime crisis led to struc-
tural changes in terms of how money and monetary policy a¤ected the uc-
tuations in output and ination. The role of the money demand shock is thus
important during crises, as indicated by the fact that structural changes in
the economy will occur several months before the peak of the crisis. There-
fore, comparing this role with a nancial risk-related indicator should be
useful for assessing the link between risks and the role of money in the econ-
omy.
5 Moneys role and nancial conditions
Michelson and Suhoy (2014) propose the use of a synthetic FCI to track the
comovement of nancial variables. This FCI, based on 28 variables recorded
at di¤erent frequencies (daily to quarterly), provides di¤erent measures for
risk, leverage, and liquidity in the Israeli nancial markets, with their state-
space model-based methodology close to those of Aruoba et al. (2009) and
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Brave and Butters (2012). Fig. 9 compares this FCI with the role of money
demand in output uctuations.
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Figure 9: Comparison of the role of money demand on output and the FCI
for Israel (Michelson and Suhoy, 2014)
To isolate the nancial component, Michelson and Suhoy (2014) adjust
these series for the past real cycle and for structural changes in the Israeli
economy due to changes in the ination environment. The index is then ex-
tracted by using the Kalman lter and applied to time series that have miss-
ing values resulting either from low-frequency data or from non-synchronous
updating times. The index is nally scaled in standard deviation units and
has a zero mean, corresponding to normal nancial conditions, with positive
(negative) values indicating tightening (loosening) conditions.
As we theoretically and empirically showed earlier, the respective roles
of risk and money holdings on output variance are strongly linked. Thus,
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comparing an FCI that aggregates several measures of risk as well as the
impact of money holdings on output uctuations should allow us to draw
interesting conclusions about correlations and causality properties.
This comparison (see Fig. 9) shows that our results are not only the
consequences of nancial shocks. During the study period, our indicator,
the role of money on output (i.e., the variance decomposition of output with
respect to the contribution of money shocks), follows the same dynamics as
that presented by Michelson and Suhoy (2014). This nding means that
the impact of money on output and thus on the economy is important for
deep, or more structural, crises, conrming that it involves a recession, as
demonstrated by the active role of a households money holdings shocks on
output uctuations.
Castelnuovo (2012) also nds that moneys role was important during the
1970s but declined thereafter and that money is important for replicating
U.S. output volatility. Moreover, the risk perceptions taken into account by
our Model 2 are not only related to nancial markets: according to these
perceptions, the inuence of money demand on output uctuations indicates
that this shock provides a good predictive measure of structural changes such
as recession and depression.
In the next step, following Székely et al. (2007), we use the distance
correlation in order to analyze linear and non-linear dependency between the
FCI, and its bank and debt components, and the role of money on output.
We nd that the Pearson correlation coe¢ cient is only sensitive to linear
relationships between two variables, whereas it can easily be zero for the
dependent variables. Because the distance correlation assesses both linear
and non-linear relationships between two variables, even non-stationary ones,
it is a more complete correlation test than using the Pearson correlation
coe¢ cient.
FCI Bank Debt Forex Equities Resid.
Money shocks
contribution to
output variance
0.299 0.425 0.292 0.336 0.263 0.293
Table 1: Distance correlations between the role of money on output and the
FCI and its components
Table 1 shows that our indicator, the contribution of a money shock to
output variance (see Fig. 6), is not linearly or non-linearly independent of
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the FCI or its components. Considering this result, we apply the widely
used concept of Granger causality between our indicator and the FCI and
its components to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two
series. One stationary variable is said to Granger cause another, given an
information set, if past information about the former can improve the forecast
of the latter based only on its own past information. In other words, the
knowledge of one series evolution reduces the forecast errors of the other.
The Granger causality test is thus a useful tool to test the predictive power
of a variable on another. To achieve stationarity, and because our indicator
is not cointegrated with any component of the FCI, we take our variables
in di¤erences. The lag selection process for the Granger tests is in line with
those used in previous studies.14
The presented ndings imply that our indicator causes bank and debt
components, at 0.89% (F-test: 7.52) and 7.80% (F-test: 3.25), respectively.15
Our indicator is not caused by the FCI or by one of its components. Con-
sequently, outputs variance decomposition with respect to the money shock
(our indicator) seems to be a good predictive indicator of bank and debt
risks.
6 Policy implications
Our dynamic analysis involves several policy recommendations. First, policy
makers have to re-estimate their models at regular intervals in order to mon-
itor parameter changes (Section 3.2). This is crucial to take new information
(from the gap between the rst and last released data) into account and
to examine other simulations and forecasts based on these new estimations
(Section 3.3).
For instance, even if a monetary policy committee does not follow its rule-
based commitment for the nominal short-term interest rate, small changes
14We run an unrestricted VAR of the two considered variables. After checking that our
estimated model is dynamically stable (inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial
diagram), we run a sequential modied likelihood ratio (LR) test (each test at the 5%
level) with a lag length criteria of four (quarterly data). The LR test provides the best lag
for our Granger causality test between the two variables considered. To conserve space, we
have not included the VAR estimation results, the optimal lag-length table, or the inverse
roots of the AR characteristic polynomial diagram here. However, these are available upon
request.
15The lag length is chosen to be one, which is the optimal lag length with respect to the
LR lag length criterion. The lag lengths provided by other criteria (Final prediction error,
Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan-Quinn information criteria) also lead to signicant Granger
causality.
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in the model and rule parameters could be relevant to the transmission of
a shock across the economy (Section 3.3.2). In this case, a decision-making
process based on old estimated parameters could lead to incorrect dynamic
and transmission channel perspectives, especially during crisis periods (Ko-
lasa, 2015).
The transmission of shocks changes over time and analyzing these policy
tools with out-of-date data and estimated models can mask economic tran-
sitions (see the online appendix) and consequently, negatively impact the
credibility of policy institutions.
Second, adding money to policy-making models could improve forecasting
accuracy, at least during crisis periods. This recommendation is not new in
the literature on the Eurozone (Benchimol, 2011; Benchimol and Fourçans,
2016) and US (Caraiani, 2015): adding non-separability between consump-
tion and money to household preferences could improve forecasts. This raises
the question of why almost all central bank DSGE models occult money.
The relevance of this question is reinforced by the fact that the DSGE
models of central banks have several roles: they allow for communication with
the public regarding various topics (forecast, shock transmission, economic
explanation, and interpretation). Although DSGE model outputs might not
be an easy way through which to communicate policy, they at least represent
a good tool for economists to talk about and explore the economic situation.
Therefore, by adding money to their models and thus to their communica-
tions, they could probably improve or at least complete their communica-
tions, forecasts, explanations and interpretations of economic dynamics.
Third, money variables could be good indicators of economic risk (Section
5). Most economic institutions, especially after the last GFC, put forward
economic risk detection, its monitoring and management and developed for-
eign condition indexes.16 Thus, obtaining more advanced indicators of debt
and bank risks could be of great importance. Although our models aim to
incorporate the simple perspective of the role of money on the economy, cen-
tral banks should invest time and energy into developing more elaborated
New Keynesian DSGE models that include money in non-separable and
more elaborate estimation techniques (such as moving-window and short-
sample Bayesian estimation, among others) to detect and monitor risks in
their economies.
Changing the research agendas of central banks in line with our previ-
ous policy recommendations could lead to more accurate forecasts and risk
monitoring as well as better communication, thereby increasing credibility.
16See for instance Moccero et al. (2014) for the US and Brave and Butters (2012) for
the Eurozone.
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Furthermore, money plays a role in economic dynamics. This nding is
attributed to the fact that, unlike Eggertsson andWoodford (2003), we do not
assume any household money satiation level. This strong assumption, which
intends to allow the zero interest rate bound to be reached, is sometimes
invoked for the sake of simplicity,17 although this is not our purpose here
(also because the zero bound was not reached during our analysis). Thus,
central banks could use this money demand channel to adjust their standard
monetary policies (and thus the money supply channel, because at any given
time, money demand equals money supply). Although this policy stance is
not new, few papers (none of which are about Israel) demonstrate this policy
recommendation through such economic modeling by showing that money
plays a role in economic dynamics.
7 Conclusion
This study examined the role of money and monetary policy during the past
decade in Israel (2001 Q1 to 2013 Q1), with a particular focus on the GFC
period and the provision of policy implications. We compared two DSGE
models: a baseline model without money (Model 1), as in Galí (2008), and a
model with non-separable preferences between household consumption and
real money balances (Model 2), as in Benchimol and Fourçans (2012). Both
models were tested by using rolling window Bayesian estimations to empiri-
cally estimate the variations in the micro- and macro-parameters over time.
We also ran simulations to obtain variance decompositions from both models
over the study period and to capture the short- and long-run dynamics, which
are generally hidden in longer sample ranges. Our analysis shows that out-
put uctuations are increasingly inuenced by money demand shocks during
crisis periods. The impact of conventional monetary policy on output and
ination has also been a¤ected during the past, notably increasing at the
beginning of the GFC period.
The results presented herein also underscore that the impact of money
on output variability diminishes signicantly during crisis recovery peri-
ods. However, ination variability does not seem to be a¤ected directly by
money variables and is rather mainly explained by monetary policy and price
markup shocks in the short and long runs, in line with the ndings presented
thus far in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Christo¤el et al., 2008).
Finally, the role of a money shock in this kind of rolling window estimation
framework, where micro- and macro-parameters are re-estimated over time,
can be seen as an advanced indicator of structural changes for the Israeli
17See, for instance, note 22 in Poilly (2010).
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economy. Our results may thus help inform central banks and policymakers
about the importance of money shocks as advanced indicators of risk (see
Fig. 9). Furthermore, the results highlight the more signicant role played
by real money balances than generally expected during crises as well as the
changing role of monetary policy.
Last, our ndings imply that the contribution of money shocks to output
variance causes bank and debt risks, conrming the ability of our indicator
to provide central banks with relevant information on several kinds of risks.
Despite the presented ndings, future researchers might consider compar-
ing these models by using second-order estimations, which, by assigning a
more explicit role to relative risk aversion (Benchimol, 2014), could improve
our results. In addition, our study is limited by the assumed simplicity of
the employed models relative to the assumptions of general DSGE models
and New Keynesian approaches (Chari et al., 2009).
Finally, although the conclusions drawn by this study may not be useful
for providing quarter-to-quarter quantitative policy advice, looking at the
inuence of money shocks on the variance in the main economic variables
could nonetheless capture important information about economic and nan-
cial risks before they occur. The consideration of non-separability between
money holdings and consumption should lead to several policy improvements,
and updating information (data) in models used for policy implementation,
monitoring, and communication should lead to better central bank credi-
bility. Finally, because money plays a role in economic dynamics, we also
demonstrate that central banks could use money demand/supply channels to
adjust their standard monetary policies.
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